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CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY OF
ENTERPRISE GROUPS:
THE CHOICE OF LAW CHALLENGE
Irit Mevorach*
INTRODUCTION
It is not surprising that the problems of choice of law and international
group insolvency have not been sufficiently addressed during the initial
development of cross-border insolvency frameworks.1 The choice of law
problem raises difficult questions and affects substantive rights in the
context of cross-border insolvency.2 International group enterprises come
about in different legal and operational structures, requiring a sufficiently
nuanced regime that could properly accommodate the diverse types of
groups.3 Generally, the regulation of groups is difficult, as it raises a
concern of defeating the economic merits of the corporate form.4
Addressing the combined problem of international groups and choice of law
presents significant challenges, and requires careful analysis of economic
structures and their implications on both creditors’ expectations regarding
their substantive rights and the ability to achieve efficient solutions in
insolvency. This Article aims to provide a roadmap of choice of law
solutions in international enterprise group cases, and to compare these
solutions with the existing cross-border insolvency practice and the cross-
border insolvency frameworks.
* Dr. Irit Mevorach, Senior Counsel, World Bank; Associate Professor, University of
Nottingham. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and do not represent the
views of the World Bank, its board of directors or the countries they represent. The author would
like to thank the participants at the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Symposium on Choice of Law in Cross-Border Bankruptcy Cases for their helpful comments to
the earlier draft of this paper.
1. The EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (Council Regulation 1346/2000, On
Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EU Insolvency Regulation]) that
entered into force in 2002 includes a choice of law regime, but the UNCITRAL Model Law (U.N.
COMM. ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (1997) [hereinafter
MODEL LAW]) of 1997 does not. See infra Part V. Both frameworks currently do not explicitly
address group insolvencies.
2. See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies:
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook,
Theory and Pragmatism].
3. See IRITMEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHINMULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE GROUPS 30–31,
127 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
4. See Tom Hadden, Regulating Corporate Groups: An International Perspective, in
CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHANGING STRUCTURES AND THE DYNAMICS OF
REGULATION 343, 358–60 (1993); CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, The Wholly Owned and the
Controlled Subsidiary, in CLIVEM. SCHMITTHOFF’S SELECT ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 218 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 1978); PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE
TO CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR ANEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993).
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Part I of this Article discusses the main schools of thought with regard
to the resolution of cross-border insolvency, and considers which theory
generally provides a more compelling choice of law solution for
international insolvency cases. Part II considers how the preferred choice of
law solution may apply in cases of groups, and what might be the specific
concerns in its application to such cases. Part III looks at the diversity of
group structures and considers the choice of law solutions that may be
applied in these different circumstances. Part IV analyzes the EU
Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency in terms of their choice of law mechanisms (to the extent such
exist) and their application to group cases.
This Article argues that in general, an efficient and fair international
insolvency process requires a “universalist” approach, whereby a single
jurisdiction governs the proceeding and applies its laws (the laws of the
forum) regarding the insolvency matters, subject to limited exceptions. It
also argues that universalism applied to the international group as a whole
is often the preferred approach, since many groups operate a single global
business that require a group-wide solution in the course of insolvency. The
concern that group-wide global solutions that encompass several companies
would interfere with the corporate form is of lesser relevance in this regard
and is generally unjustified, since the choice of law determination does not
entail “lifting of the corporate veil.” Rather, it is a private international law
determination linked to expectations regarding forum and law that should
derive from ascertaining a real connection to a home country. Indeed, given
the diversity of group structures, a one size fits all solution is not
appropriate, and while some groups will require a global group-wide
solution in insolvency, others may not. Still, although a toolkit of solutions
is required, the focus should be on the universalist solutions that would
target many group (or parts of groups) that enter insolvency as a whole, and
that would promote rescues and going concern sales.
The universalist approach suggested in this Article for the private
international law problem should not be confused with issues concerning
the substantive rules of group insolvency and solutions such as “substantive
consolidation” (the pooling of assets and debts of the different group
entities together in the course of insolvency) that do entail “veil lifting.”
The substantive consolidation dilemma is outside the scope of this paper.5
This Article focuses on the private international law solution that may
5. The application of such a solution requires more caution. The starting position should be
respect of the corporate form. Substantive consolidation should only be applied when the group
was heavily integrated and its assets and debts were intermingled. See MEVORACH, supra note 3,
at 215–29; see also U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON
INSOLVENCY LAW, PART THREE, rec. 220, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.16 (2012) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE PART THREE]. For a different approach, see Leif M. Clark,
Managing Distribution to Claimants in Cross-Border Enterprise Group Insolvency, 9 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 111 (2014).
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support any type of group treatment, including procedural or substantive
consolidation, as may be appropriate in the circumstances.
I. THE SUPREMACY OF THE UNIVERSALIST ONE LAW
LINKED TO ONE FORUM SOLUTION
The design of cross-border insolvency frameworks requires
consideration of the opposing theories of universalism and territorialism.6
Universalism is founded on the idea of “unity of bankruptcy;” for every
given debtor there should logically be a unified process of administration of
the estate in the event of insolvency.7 It corresponds with the assertion that,
as insolvency should entail a collective process, an effective insolvency
system should be symmetrical with the market—covering all or nearly all
transactions and stakeholders in that market.8 Territorialism, on the other
hand, stresses state sovereignty and emphasizes the importance of and
unique distinctions between national legal regimes. It strives to ensure
minimum interference with domestic policies. It also suggests that nations
may be concerned about subordinating their own bankruptcy laws and
policies to the laws and policies of another jurisdiction.9 Indeed, legal
systems often tend to take a territorialist stance in the absence of binding
global frameworks.10
Specifically, under universalism, cross-border insolvencies would be
administered by a single court that would apply a single insolvency law.11
In the absence of unified international institutions,12 the application of such
regime could be achieved by harmonizing the private international law rules
pertaining to insolvency.13 Thus, the rules would identify the “home
country” of the multinational debtor, namely the forum to which the debtor
has the most substantial connections. Assets of the debtor located in other
countries would be transferred to this jurisdiction.
6. See IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (James J.
Fawcett ed., 2d ed. 2005).
7. See id. at 11–12.
8. The concept of collectivism in insolvency is widely accepted in bankruptcy theory. See id.
at 8–10.
9. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational
Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 5, 8–9, 12 (2003); Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23
MICH. J. INT’L L. 31 (2001).
10. See Ian F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law 12 (James J. Fawcett ed., 2d
ed. 2005).
11. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism¸ supra note 2, 458; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A
Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2277 (2000) [hereinafter
Westbrook, A Global Solution].
12. That is to say, a single international bankruptcy law and a single international bankruptcy
court system. SeeWestbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 11.
13. Ordinary private international law principles would continue to govern questions of non-
insolvency law such as the validity of claims.
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Ideally, the forum administering the case would apply its own rules
regarding matters of insolvency—the lex fori concursus (the law of the state
of the opening of proceedings)—to govern the commencement, conduct,
administration, and conclusion of the insolvency proceedings.14 Insolvency
is regarded as based on procedural norms that are typically within the
domain of the forum under private international law regimes. In addition,
insolvency embodies fundamental values, which should be protected by the
forum.15 The application of the law of the forum where insolvency
proceedings are administered avoids potentially costly and extensive
litigation to determine issues of applicable law. As long as the insolvency
law of the forum is uniformly applied in its entirety, the case is governed by
a single coherent system. Under a unified approach to cross-border
insolvency, stakeholders can expect increased predictability, which in turn
can reduce transaction costs and risk premiums.16 Universalism also accords
with the idea that all creditors wherever located should be treated
equitably.17
Territorialism suggests that the universalist single law/single forum
approach is unrealistic and instead the cross-border insolvency framework
should follow the territorialist inclination of states.18 Often, national private
international laws of insolvency that afford insolvency proceedings of the
national system with universal effects do not reciprocally acknowledge the
effects of foreign insolvency proceedings conducted under the laws of a
14. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 1019, 1021–22 (2007). This concentrated choice of law concept applies only to
insolvency matters and does not affect rules in regard to the creation of rights and claims. The
latter continues to be governed by general conflict of law rules. Thus, the insolvency forum will
need to apply its conflict of law rules to determine which laws govern the validity and
effectiveness of a right or claim.
15. FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 89.
16. Westbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 11, at 2286; Andrew T. Guzman, International
Bankruptcy: In Defence of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2179, 2181, 2270 (2000);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2252, 2255. Indeed the lex fori concursus is the dominant rule, adopted in the EU
Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4(1); U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, rec. 31, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2004) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE]; AM. LAW INST., Global Rules on Conflict-of-Laws Matters in
Insolvency Cases, in TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES ann. at 200, r. 12, (2012), available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/557/5932.htm [hereinafter Global Rules].
It is often subject to exceptions, though. See discussion infra Part V.
17. FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 11–12. Cf. Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007), who would favour a solution of one court but multiple laws to
avoid incentives for forum shopping or the need for excessive harmonization.
18. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational
Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 5, 8–9, 12 (2003); Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23
MICH. J. INT’L L. 31 (2001).
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foreign state.19 Thus, under territorialism, insolvency should be handled on
a separate territorial basis, that is, in each jurisdiction where the company
has assets. The universalist concept of a single forum and law presiding
over an international insolvency is also regarded by territorialists as
unfeasible, due to the potential difficulty in identifying a “home country”
for a multinational corporation for the purpose of insolvency.20 Finally,
even if such a place can be ascertained, territorialists remain concerned that
local creditors might be in a disadvantageous position because of the
difficulty of participating in foreign proceedings and because creditor rights
may be adversely affected by the change of the forum and laws.21
However, territorialism does not address the special problems of
international insolvencies. It could actually prove counter-productive for
reorganization or efficient liquidations of an entire international company if
each jurisdiction involved handles a fraction of the case. Fragmented
administration and multiplicity of applicable laws could increase the cost of
the process and make it difficult to reach a package sale or a restructuring of
the business as a whole.22 Furthermore, notwithstanding the pessimistic
prediction that a one law linked to one forum approach would be
“politically impossible and wholly unworkable,”23 evidence suggests that
cross-border insolvency frameworks adopting versions of universalism have
thus far managed to produce quite consistent, predictable, and appropriate
results.24
Nonetheless, universalism requires some mitigation to take into account
local policies, expectations, and diversity of enterprise structures. Indeed,
the key existing cross-border insolvency frameworks adopt a modified
version of universalism.25 Proponents of universalism have also proposed
modified universalism as the best solution in the short- to medium-term.26
19. FLETCHER, supra note 6, at 12.
20. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist
Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 716–25; 751–53 (1999).
21. See id. at 713–18.
22. Professor LoPucki has suggested, though, that territorialism may have a ‘cooperative’
element whereby States will retain full sovereignty, yet may collaborate in international
insolvency cases when they find it mutually beneficial. LoPucki, supra note 9; LoPucki, supra
note 20.
23. See, e.g., Tung, supra note 9.
24. See Irit Mevorach, Jurisdiction in Insolvency: A Study of European Courts’ Decisions, 6 J.
PRIVATE INT’L L. 327 (2010) [hereinafter Mevorach, Jurisdiction in Insolvency]; Irit Mevorach,
On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 517 (2011) [hereinafter Mevorach, On
the Road to Universalism] (claiming that the Model Law has been a catalyst of universalism); JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT CHAPTER 15 (2010) (as presented to the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges). Cf. Jeremy Leong, Is Chapter 15 Universalist or
Territorialist? Empirical Evidence from United States Bankruptcy Court Cases, 29 WISC. INT’L
L.J. 110 (2012).
25. See infra Part V.
26. SeeWestbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 11.
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Under modified universalism, a cross-border insolvency system would
identify the main insolvency jurisdiction that would administer the case,
and whose laws would apply to most of the insolvency matters. Indeed,
modified universalism’s aim would be to administer the case by taking a
global collective perspective. Yet, modified universalism would also
subject the global approach to certain specific exceptions to accommodate
local expectations, for example, regarding rights in rem.27 Furthermore,
additional proceedings may be opened and regarded as “ancillary,” in aid of
a “main” (i.e., primary) proceeding. A modified universalist regime may
also provide for “secondary” proceedings in cases in which this would
better fit with creditors’ expectations, for example because the enterprise
had a significant presence in the jurisdiction, or where it would assist the
proceedings in the main forum. If secondary proceedings are opened, the
local forum may apply its own laws with regard to assets located in the
jurisdiction, though indeed the more the system allows secondary
proceedings to take place, the less it may benefit from the advantages of
universalism.28 Under modified universalist regimes, recognition of foreign
insolvency proceedings and assistance to the foreign courts may not be
automatic. Domestic courts might retain discretion to evaluate the fairness
of the home country procedures and laws, or apply public policy safety
valves to deny recognition or assistance and protect the interests of local
creditors.29 Modified universalism accommodates situations where a
number of full parallel processes take place, and still provides for
cooperation towards a harmonized solution to the multiple proceedings.
Universalism can be further supported by “contractualist” solutions.
The contractualist theory suggests, with regard to international insolvency,
giving full effect to parties’ choice of the international insolvency regime.
This theory has gained little support.30 Indeed, it fails to appreciate the
multiparty nature of insolvency regimes and the divergence in the nature of
claimants.31 However, ad hoc contractualism in the course of the
international insolvency, whereby parties agree on how to coordinate the
cross-border insolvency process by way of agreement on “protocols,” could
contribute to an effective implementation of global universalist solutions in
insolvency.32
Thus, the universalist one law linked to one forum approach, achieved
by the harmonization of private international laws of insolvency, is an
27. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 5–15; see also Global Rules, supra note
16, r. 15–22. Cf. UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVEGUIDE PART THREE, supra note 5, recs. 32–33.
28. See infra Part V on the EU Insolvency Regulation scheme.
29. See infra Part V on the Model Law scheme.
30. See Rasmussen, supra note 16, at 2255.
31. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An
Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1201, 1248–54 (2005).
32. See Irit Mevorach, Towards a Consensus on the Treatment of Enterprise Groups in
Insolvency, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L&COMP. L. 359, 405 (2010).
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effective way to deal with cross-border insolvencies. It should be subject to
safety valves and exceptions in a restrained manner so that exceptions do
not “swallow” the universalist rule,33 and it should be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate different enterprise structures. Such an approach
accommodates territorialism concerns, without considerably sacrificing
insolvency objectives. Contractualism also fits well within a modified
universalist paradigm where it contributes to the achievement of a global
approach without undermining those same concerns of territorialism.
II. UNIVERSALISM AND THE GROUP CONTEXT
Cross-border insolvencies involving groups present greater
complexities compared with cases of single company insolvency, and the
appropriateness of universalism to resolve such cases is accordingly less
straightforward. Indeed, territorialist arguments against a global perspective
to multinational default are stronger in an enterprise group context, i.e.,
where the “single law linked to a single forum” approach purports to apply
to a group as a whole. In cases involving groups, the problems highlighted
by territorialists and mentioned above—such as predictability of a home
country forum, possible defeat of creditor entitlement by the alteration of
the forum and law, and interference with state sovereignty—might be more
pronounced. Group enterprises may operate as conglomerates of
independent and separate entities located in different jurisdictions.
Dislocating the insolvency forum from the entities’ home country to
another forum (a group forum of some sort), and applying that other
forum’s laws, could therefore distort such expectations and preclude state
control over locally formed and controlled entities. Arguably, a universalist
approach applied to the group as a whole may not be necessary at all, and
territorialism may better fit with the way groups operate.34
The reality, though, is more multifaceted. There is, in fact, a wide range
of group structures, and group entities often operate beyond national
33. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Breaking Away: Local Priorities and Global Assets, 46
TEX. INT’L L.J. 601 (2011); Leif M. Clark & Karen Goldstein, Sacred Cows: How to Care for
Secured Creditors’ Rights in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 513 (2011). Cf.
Edward J. Janger, Reciprocal Comity, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441 (2011) (who suggests giving a
greater role to local priorities in the context of modified universalist solutions); John A. E. Pottow,
A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 579
(2011) [hereinafter Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies]
(discussing the merits of synthetic secondary proceedings over traditional secondary proceedings).
Pottow suggests that secondary proceedings are a necessary evil, required to get skeptical states to
subscribe to universalism. Id. at 581, 584. See also John A. E. Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs and
Toward Reliance: A Normative Framework for Cross-Border Insolvency Choice of Law, 9
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 202, 205–06 (2014) [hereinafter Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs and
Toward Reliance].
34. LoPucki, supra note 20, at 750. See also the regime proposed for international enterprise
groups in the UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVEGUIDE PART THREE, supra note 5, which is mainly based
on cooperation of multiple territorial proceedings. See infra Part V.
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borders through their close affiliation with the other entities, even when the
enterprise is formally segregated into separate entities in different countries.
Moreover, the group as a whole may be functionally integrated and operate
a single business or single lines of businesses across entities. In some
circumstances, the enterprise may even be so heavily integrated that assets
and debts were intermingled in the ordinary course of business.35 A one size
fits all solution that provides for separate territorial proceedings at the
location of the subsidiaries for any group in cross-border insolvency would
often diverge from the way multinational groups actually operate and
therefore fail to facilitate beneficial global group-wide solutions.36
Furthermore, at least with regard to those international groups whose
subsidiaries are significantly linked to the home country group’s nerve
center the application of local policies to the group entities might be in any
event limited in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, taking a
multinational approach in insolvency in such cases would not defeat state
sovereignty in functional terms.37
Territorialists argue that even if there is some sense in universalism in a
group context, it is impractical since it is impossible to identify a group
home country in which proceedings could be centrally administered with
sufficient predictability.38 Yet, this concern should be evaluated in view of
the diversity of group structures, and the fact that in practice some common
group organizational forms may have a clear group center. In other words,
territorialist concerns regarding the feasibility of universalism in a group
context are overstated to some extent and require closer evaluation of group
economic reality and its effect on the need for a global approach in
insolvency, on expectations, and on local control.
There may also be a concern that universalism applied to groups would
defeat the fundamental company law principle of the corporate form. Yet,
this concern is largely misconceived. Indeed, the key economic rationale for
respecting the corporate form and, in a group context, applying entity
principles39 is the reduction of transaction costs and encouragement of
35. SeeMEVORACH, supra note 3, ch. 5.
36. A coordinated group-wide approach can avoid separate sales of assets resulting from
disintegration which may be value destroying as was apparent in the case of KPNQwest N.V. See
ROBERT VAN GALEN, THE EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY REGULATION AND GROUPS OF COMPANIES
(2003) (presented at the INSOL Europe Annual Congress). It can also avoid lack of smooth
cooperation between affiliates. An example is the Lehman Brothers case where the UK
administrators of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) refused to become a party to a
cross-border protocol proposed by the U.S. Bankruptcy court. See In re Lehman Brothers
International (Europe) (in administration), [2011] EWHC (Ch) 2022.
37. See alsoWestbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 11, 2298–99, 2310–11.
38. See LoPucki, supra note 20 at 716–18.
39. The respect of corporate personality and limited liability in the regulation of groups can be
contrasted with “enterprise law,” which suggests considering the group as the relevant “entity.”
See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J.
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commerce through the segregation of assets and debts (“asset partitioning”)
among affiliates in a group.40 However, private international laws that
would take account of group interconnectedness in order to ascertain the
proper forum and the applicable law would not interfere with asset
segregation within the group.
Conflict of law rules are characteristically based on connecting factors
linking the legal relationship to the appropriate forum and applicable law.
The connecting factor in corporate insolvency that determines both forum
and laws choices is primarily based on geography, i.e. the presence of the
main economic activity of the debtor in a particular country. In the case of
integrated groups, there is no reason why the geographical link of a debtor
to a jurisdiction would not be created through its connection to other
entities in a group that have presence in that forum. Thus, a universalist
approach applied to groups would determine the choice of law and forum in
accordance with economic reality, taking account of the specific group
scenario. Accordingly, it would in many cases find that the entire integrated
group has a unified main forum to which all entities are connected. The
universalist approach would have no say, though, on the issue of liability
between affiliates and the segregation of asset and debts. Indeed, in the
course of insolvency of enterprise groups (wherever the case may take place
and under which laws), it may be determined by the presiding forum, based
on the applicable law, that a parent should be liable for the debts of the
subsidiary, or that proceedings should be substantively consolidated. Such
solutions that an insolvency law might provide would no doubt directly
interfere with asset partitioning, as they would allow the “lifting” of the
“corporate veil.” Therefore, clearly and strictly defined pre-requisites may
apply in such scenarios, such as the proof of fraud, wrongful trading by
shadow corporate directors or very strong integration.41 However, such
determination of whether to treat the entities separately or link them
substantively is a different matter, separate from the private international
law aspects of the administration of a group insolvency case.
III. APPLYING THE GROUP FORUM LAWS: NOT A ONE SIZE
FITS ALL SOLUTION
Many cross-border insolvency cases of groups involve economically
integrated enterprises because such enterprises are prone to the “domino
effect,” with the insolvency of one or few entities of the group cascading
CORP. L. 283 (1990); Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Wholly Owned and the Controlled Subsidiary, J.
BUS. L. 218, 219–22 (1978).
40. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
41. SeeMEVORACH, supra note 3, at 215–29, 294–318.
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throughout the entire integrated enterprise.42 Integration may be in terms of
the group business, where the entire group or some parts thereof have run a
single or an interdependent business. In the more rare cases, the integration
is in terms of the assets and debts, whereby the affairs and liabilities of the
different entities have been intermingled and inseparable.43
In any event, the existence of integration would suggest that some
degree of coordination in the course of insolvency would be critical for
achieving efficient solutions, connecting the different entities proceedings
together—potentially centralizing all proceedings in a single jurisdiction
and governing the process by a single set of laws. Centralization of the
process and concentration of the laws may be particularly important where
the envisaged solution is reorganization or a going concern sale of the
integrated business. In a piecemeal liquidation, it is possible to break the
integrated group into pieces and address the insolvency on a jurisdiction-
by-jurisdiction basis. Even then, a group may benefit from a joint “package
sale” of its assets; however, the going concern value of the joint business
could be lost and reorganization of the enterprise might be impossible in the
absence of a group-wide approach. Achieving such group-wide solutions
may be possible through cooperation across borders. Still, mere cooperation
between parallel processes taking place in different countries and subject to
different laws may not be sufficiently effective. In particular, coordinated
solutions may be hampered where different insolvency laws would apply to
the different entities in insolvency. It may be especially difficult to achieve
group-wide reorganizations where rules—for example, regarding voting,
plan confirmation, and new financing—are different,44 and even more so
where multiple jurisdictions are involved. Concentration of the laws and
processes in one or two jurisdictions could facilitate the reorganization
significantly.45
Concentration of laws and proceedings is also particularly sensible
where substantive consolidation is envisaged for the enterprise, since
substantive consolidation would require treating the enterprise as a single
entity for distributional purposes, ignoring the random position of assets in
different jurisdictions.46 Indeed, such a solution should be applied sparingly.
42. Non-integrated groups are less likely to collapse as a whole and thus the question of
whether to apply universalist or territorialist solutions to the group would not normally arise.
43. SeeMEVORACH, supra note 3, at 30–31, 132.
44. See, e.g., the Enron case in which a complex plan needed to be designed in order to
overcome the differences between the chapter 11 and scheme of arrangement regimes (In re
Enron, No. 01-16034, 2001 Extra LEXIS 304 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2001)).
45. Subject to the same exceptions to the lex concursus rule that would apply in a single
company insolvency case. The nature and rationale for such exceptions is beyond the scope of the
paper. But see the discussion in Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs and Toward Reliance, supra note 33;
Edward J. Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional Baseline in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 9
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 180, 184–87 (2014).
46. Such a solution was achieved by way of agreement between the liquidators in the BCCI
case. The assets and debts of the different entities were pooled together under the supervision of
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The rationale for applying substantive consolidation and the extent to which
such solution should be pursued in relevant circumstances is, as noted
earlier, beyond the scope of this paper.47 What is relevant for the purpose of
the private international law and choice of law analysis is that the cross-
border insolvency framework be able to support a group solution, including
where substantive consolidation is necessary. If different laws apply to the
group enterprise’s insolvency, each set of laws may impose different pre-
conditions for applying substantive consolidation. For example, the parent
company’s forum laws may provide for substantive consolidation only
where assets and liabilities of the group entities were intermingled in the
course of business, while the subsidiary’s forum laws may require as a
condition for substantive consolidation proof of creditor reliance on the
group as a whole. Legal systems may also vary in the way to apply
substantive consolidation. The fragmentation of applicable law is likely to
impede any coherent solution.
Centralization of the law and forum in cases of integrated enterprises is
thus conducive to group-wide solutions that may better match the economic
reality of the enterprise. However, the assumption of efficiency of this
universalist approach, as well as the question of compatibility with spheres
of control and expectations, requires consideration of the degree of
geographical spread of the enterprise and the way it has been managed
internationally. Specifically, it requires drawing a distinction between two
typical structures of integrated enterprise groups: those groups that have
been controlled centrally (centralized groups) and those groups that
although integrated in various ways, have been managed in a decentralized
manner and operated the global business through autonomous entities
(decentralized groups).48
A. INTEGRATED CENTRALIZED GROUPS
It is submitted that in cases where the integrated group was controlled
and managed centrally,49 the optimal approach in the course of insolvency
would also be full centralization of the forum and law.50 The integrated,
centralized enterprise group is in functional (economic connections) terms
the principal process in Luxemburg that also applied its insolvency laws, though some of the
jurisdictions involved ring fenced assets or applied some of their local insolvency rules. See Re
BCCI SA (No. 10) [1997] 2 WLR 172 (Ch 1996); Re BCCI SA (No. 2) [1992] BCLC 715.
47. See, e.g., MEVORACH, supra note 3, at 215–35; Henry Peter, Insolvency in a Group of
Companies, Substantive and Procedural Consolidation: When and How?, in THE CHALLENGES
OF INSOLVENCY LAW REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Henry Peter et al. eds.,Verlag Schulthess
2006); Douglas G. Baird, Substantive Consolidation Today, 47 B.C. L. REV. 5 (2005); William H.
Widen, Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237 (2007).
48. SeeMEVORACH, supra note 3, at 133–35.
49. The whole or part of the group may operate in this way.
50. Subject to the same limited exceptions to the lex fori concursus rule that should apply to a
single company’s cross-border insolvency.
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the same as a single enterprise that operates across borders via offices or
branches; only these “branches” are in fact formally separated entities and
therefore require separation between the assets and the debts of each entity
in the course of insolvency. Thus, as it is most effective to handle the cross-
border insolvency of single companies centrally in terms of the law and
forum, so would be the case for the integrated, centralized group. Similarly,
the argument about the defeat of state sovereignty in such cases is weak.
Like the multinational corporation that is not in fact governed locally, the
integrated centrally controlled group is in reality significantly linked to the
home country forum in the ordinary course, and centralization in insolvency
only follows this reality.
Even in the cases of centralized groups, however, it might be that some
of the subsidiary entities are heavy in assets and local presence, to the
extent that it would be efficient to conduct local proceedings. However,
whether or not to open additional proceedings should ideally be a decision
made by the insolvency representative supervising the main group
proceedings who would be obliged to regard the interests of the
stakeholders as a whole. Furthermore, the opening of additional
proceedings regarding the same integrated, centralized group may be
merely ancillary to the main process, and may not require the application of
a separate set of laws.
In any event, any further decentralization of the law and process would
not match the economic reality of the business enterprise. At the same time,
creditors’ entitlements vis-à-vis the entity with whom they were dealing,
and their prediction regarding the law and forum that will preside in the
event of insolvency, would not be hampered by the centralization of the
applicable law and forum. In cases of integrated centralized groups,
voluntary creditors are capable of conducting the ex ante predictions to
ascertain the group’s home country in the same way that they would for a
single company with foreign branches. Identifying a mutual predictable
center is especially feasible if the key connecting factor for insolvency
jurisdiction is the location of the economic center, rather than the place of
incorporation, and as will be noted below, cross-border insolvency
frameworks, increasingly emphasize economic reality over mere
registration as their jurisdictional test. Indeed, the place of incorporation or
registered office is likely to refer to multiple jurisdictions where entities
were registered, yet the economic center, in particular if it is equated with
the operational headquarters of the business, is likely to refer the case to a
common center for the group as a whole.51 In fact, in cases of integrated
51. In cases decided under the EC regulation, it was possible to identify a mutual predictable
center for all group members at the location of the central head-office. See Daisytek-ISA Ltd High
Court of Justice Leeds (UK) 16 May 2003, [2003] BCC 562 (ChD); Re Parkside Flexibles SA,
[2006] BCC. 589 (Eng.); MPOTEC GmbH, tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of
original jurisdiction] Nanterre, [2006] BCC 681 (Fr); Re Creative Building Maintenance Inc., et
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centralized groups, the central management of the group coincides with the
center of each group entity, and therefore can be predicted in the same way.
Because each group entity is centrally controlled from the group head office
(since the group is centralized), the entities’ home countries and the group
home country would be the same.
B. INTEGRATED DECENTRALIZED GROUPS
The choice of law analysis may be different where the group is
integrated but decentralized, that is, where the group entities—all or some
of them—are managed independently, with significant autonomy in their
respective jurisdictions, and are more loosely controlled from a group
headquarter. Although the integration of the group still suggests that the
group stakeholders would benefit from some degree of global group-wide
approach, full centralization might not be the optimal solution if entities
were locally administered. Collection of evidence and relevant information
may be difficult without opening local proceedings. Decentralization may
also suggest that separate reorganization plans or restructurings for different
divisions may be most effective. Other territorialist concerns might also be
paramount in such cases. Since the entities in a decentralized enterprise
were independent and controlled domestically or on a regional level,
creditors likely had dealings with the local or regional management,, and
therefore, they expect the applicable insolvency law to be linked to that
territorial forum. The primary choice of law solution in such cases should,
therefore, be the application of the entity’s lex fori concursus, rather than
that of a group center.52 Still, the process may be usefully synchronized to
promote an efficient solution through the leadership of the forum where the
whole integrated group was to some extent coordinated in the ordinary
course—that is, at the group coordination center. The coordination center
equates with the place of an enterprise’s headquarters, only that the function
of the headquarters has been somewhat different in the case of the
decentralized group as it coordinated the enterprise rather than closely
controlled it. The purpose of such coordination between entities of a
decentralized group, in the course of insolvency may be to exchange
relevant information or collaborate in view of a forthcoming investment in
al., Nos. 06-03586, 03587 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006); Re ROL Manufacturing (Canada) Inc., et al.,
No. 08-31022 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008). See also Gabriel Moss & Michael Haravon, “Building
Europe”—the French Case Law on COMI, 20 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 20 (2007); Gabriel
Moss, Group Insolvency—Choice of Forum and Law: The European Experience Under the
Influence of English Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1005 (2007).
52. Note that the local entity too may represent a regional group center, of a regionally
integrated centralized group, in which case the law of that entity may apply to additional entities
that were under the control of that separately managed part of the group.
2014] Cross-Border Insolvency of Enterprise Groups 239
the group as a whole, but not to fully centralize the proceedings and the
laws.53
However, the proper private international law solution for an integrated
group in insolvency may be less clear-cut. Even though in decentralized
groups, entities may exercise local autonomy, centralization in the course of
insolvency may still be the most effective approach, especially if
reorganization of the entire integrated group, or substantive consolidation,
is envisioned.54 As mentioned above, achieving group-wide reorganizations
or substantive consolidation is difficult where the process is fragmented and
multiple laws apply. The future structure planned for the enterprise may
also be such that centralization is required in the course of insolvency.
Thus, while it may have been the case that prior to the insolvency
proceedings part of the group was decentralized, a new structure may be
envisaged post-insolvency in the context of a plan that may entail a
transformation of the enterprise into a more centralized organization. At the
same time, the fact of pre-insolvency decentralization requires
consideration of the redistribution risk and the potential uncertainty
regarding the applicable law.
These scenarios, therefore, present some degree of conflict or mismatch
between the advance of optimal insolvency solutions ex post after the
opening of insolvency proceedings (and in view of future restructuring of
the business) and the respect of pre-insolvency rights and expectations that
affect ex ante efficiency. The dilemma can be resolved, though, through a
sufficiently nuanced choice of law regime that would allow the central
(main) group forum to address the applicable law question more flexibly.
The main group forum at the group headquarters, where proceedings would
be centralized, may be required to uphold creditor pre-insolvency
entitlements in such cases, pursuant to the subsidiary’s center of main
interests (COMI) insolvency law and ensure that creditors are not worse off
by the application of the laws of the group forum. Yet, the center forum
may not apply the local laws wholesale. Such an approach might be
counter-productive to achieving group-wide effective solutions. It will be
sufficient to ensure that specific protections afforded to local creditors are
upheld through, for example, respecting priorities under the local law
regarding the local assets. The application of other rules and processes of
the group center is justifiable—both because it will promote the insolvency
goals by allowing efficient solutions in the course of insolvency and
because it fits with the private international law analysis that is based on a
53. See Irit Mevorach, The Home Country of a Multinational Enterprise Group Facing
Insolvency, 57 INT’L&COMP. L.Q. 427, 446–47 (2008).
54. Indeed, the latter scenario (substantive consolidation for decentralized groups) is less likely
to occur, since it is more conceivable that a heavily integrated intermingled group that would
require substantive consolidation would also be centralized in terms of its management. It is a
more conceivable scenario in circumstances of fraud.
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connection between entities and jurisdictions.55 In the integrated but
decentralized cases, in addition to having distinct centers, the group entities
have also had a significant link to the group center forum that has been
coordinating the enterprise. The approach is similar to the “synthetic
secondary proceeding”56 solution that has been employed in practice,
whereby all proceedings were opened at group headquarters and the
opening of additional secondary proceedings regarding the same group
entities was avoided by applying certain local laws that grant protections to
creditors.57
C. OTHER INTEGRATED GROUPS
Finally, some group enterprises, even if integrated, may be structured in
a way that would make it difficult to identify a single economic center
where the group as a whole is centrally controlled or coordinated. For
example, a group enterprise may be split organizationally whereby several
sets of management control the group,58 or it may be structured in a way in
which there is no central location exercising control over subsidiaries. Thus,
instead of having one “head” and “brain” controlling or coordinating the
entire group, there may be two or more heads of the enterprise. Decision-
making may also take place between management centers of equally
positioned entities in horizontal types of structures.59 In the event of
insolvency of such groups, it may be appropriate to open more than one
central proceeding and apply more than one set of laws. It might be
55. A connection that also generates expectations and reliance.
56. See Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies, supra
note 33, at 199. The concept is referred to as “virtual territoriality” in Edward J. Janger, Virtual
Territoriality, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401, 408–09 (2010), and as the “as if” approach in
Bob Wessels, Contracting Out of Secondary Insolvency Proceedings: The Main Liquidator’s
Undertaking in the Meaning of Article 18 in the Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency
Regulation, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 63, 75–76 (2014).
57. See, e.g., Re MG Rover Belux SA/NV (In Administration), [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1296
(Eng.); see also Heribert Hirte, Towards a Framework for the Regulation of Corporate Groups’
Insolvencies, EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 213, 218 (2008). The pending amended EU Regulation will
explicitly authorize liquidators to make such undertakings to local creditors to avoid the opening
of secondary proceedings (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, art. 18(1),
COM (2012) 744 final (Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal for Amending the EU Insolvency
Regulation]); Council of the European Union, 10284/14 add 1. ann. art. 42d1-42d17 (June 3,
2014). [hereinafter Compromise Text]). See also Janger, supra note 45, at 187–89 (Janger would
give an even greater role to the synthetic proceedings approach and apply it more generally in
cross-border insolvency).
58. An example is the case of Eurotunnel (Tribunal de Commerce, Paris, Aug. 2006 (Fr.))
(unreported), where two parent companies, French and English, jointly owned the global
integrated operation. Indeed the decision on the location of COMI in this case was not “clear cut.”
Eventually the global restructuring took place under the French “Procedure de Sauvegarde”. The
French court concluded inter alia that the various group entities’ management was largely
concentrated in France, as was also described in the annual reports of the parent companies.
59. Mevorach, supra note 53, at 447–48.
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possible, however, to centralize the process to some extent where
centralization can promote the goals of the process. The court may also
consider alternative connecting factors (i.e., degree of activities, assets,
creditors etc.) to ascertain an approximate center that can lead the case
especially if a group reorganization, going concern sale or substantive
consolidation is being considered. Furthermore, by way of agreement or
cooperation between insolvency representatives or the courts, some of the
center forums may defer to a single center that would oversee the process.
The usefulness of “ad-hoc contractualism” to achieve group universalist
solutions has been noted; it may be particularly sensible to utilize this
measure in order to minimize the number of proceedings and laws that
would apply, where the envisaged solution is reorganization or substantive
consolidation that would encompass those parallel-managed parts of the
group. It is important, though, to set limitations to contractual solutions or
discretionary powers given to the court to employ alternative jurisdictional
tests. To the extent that deference and centralization entail redistribution of
rights because of a real shift of an entity’s center, there should be means of
compensation in a reorganization plan. A no worse-off rule, or requirement
of consent of those whose rights are impaired by the jurisdictional shift,
should be applied when confirming agreements on applicable law or
localizing group proceedings in an approximate center, in a way that could
advance a group plan or other group-wide solutions.
Thus, a choice of law regime applicable to groups can be nuanced
enough to accommodate the diversity of group managerial structures and
insolvency scenarios. The more the enterprise has been integrated and
centralized, and the more it requires solutions that envisage a continuation
of the group or its business, the more crucial it is to apply a universalist
solution to the group as a whole, to centralize the process and laws. The
toolkit of solutions should also include the possibility of accommodating
local priority rights in cases where entities had distinct centers yet the
process still requires a large degree of centralization. In cases of significant
decentralization or where piecemeal liquidation is desired, looser
connections between the group entities’ insolvency proceedings may be
employed through the private international law/choice of law regime. Yet,
the cases of integrated enterprises that require a large degree of
centralization in insolvency, be it because the group was significantly
integrated or because it would benefit from some type of reorganization or
going concern sale, are common cases of group insolvency on which cross-
border insolvency frameworks should focus, as practice also shows.
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IV. CHOICE OF LAW SOLUTIONS FOR GROUPS UNDER THE
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORKS
The two main cross-border insolvency frameworks on the regional and
international levels are the EU Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL
Cross-Border Insolvency Model Law. Below it is considered to what extent
these frameworks, in their current form and in view of forthcoming
developments, facilitate the type of optimal solutions suggested above for
the cases of international groups’ insolvency.
A. EU INSOLVENCYREGULATION
Under the EU Insolvency Regulation scheme, only one main
proceeding may be opened against a debtor, in the forum of its COMI, and
this proceeding should automatically be recognized and given full effect in
other Member States.60 The lex fori concursus (the law of the forum) is the
applicable law regarding insolvency matters, subject to certain exceptions,
including the possibility that secondary proceedings will be opened in
which case the law of the secondary forum will apply regarding locally
situated assets.61 Thus, the EU Regulation adopts the mitigated one law
linked to one forum approach. However, the group case is not addressed
explicitly. Currently, there are no provisions regarding centralization,
coordination, or cooperation in cases where two or more entities belonging
to the same enterprise group are in insolvency. The EU Regulation would
apply in such cases with regard to each entity separately.62
Nevertheless, the Regulation has generated pragmatic solutions in cases
of groups. Many group cases have been centralized in one forum allowing
the design of group-wide solutions through the identification of the same
COMI for all group entities at the group headquarters, and the application
of the forum law.63 The practice of the application of the EU Regulation
shows a large proportion of group cases, of which many required group-
wide solutions and that had a structure that could indicate a mutual place of
command and control.64 COMI was also interpreted as referring to a real
60. Subject to the “public policy exception.” EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 1, art. 26.
61. Id. art. 4(2).
62. See Miguel Virgós & Etienne Schmit, Report on the Convention of Insolvency
Proceedings, para. 76, (May 3, 1996), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/952/1/insolvency_report_schmidt_1988.pdf. See also Eurofood IFSC Ltd. (Case
/c-341/04) [2006] OJ 2006 C143/11, [26]-[37].
63. See, e.g., In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., [2003] BCC 562; Energotech SARL, [2007] BCC 123
(Tribunal de Grande Instance) (Fr.); Hettlage-Austria, Munich District Court (Amtsgericht), 4
May 2004, AG Munchen Beschl.v.4.5.2004-1501 IE 1276/04; Eurotunnel (Tribunal de
Commerce, Paris, Aug. 2006 (Fr.)). In some cases the forum allowed giving effect to local
priorities. See supra note 58.
64. See Mevorach, Jurisdiction in Insolvency, supra note 24, at 327; see also Gabriel Moss,
Group Insolvency — Forum — EC Regulation and Model Law Under the Influence of English
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economic center, primarily the enterprise actual head-office.65 Courts and
insolvency representatives have acknowledged the reality of integrated
groups in insolvency and ensured that a global centralized approach can be
applied in such cases. Thus, the practice developed optimal effective rules.
Nonetheless, the manner in which such group-wide approach should be
applied could be made more explicit in the Regulation. Indeed, the need to
address the case of group insolvency has been acknowledged and a new
chapter on enterprise groups has been formulated for a revised EU
Regulation (negotiations on the revised Regulation text are still ongoing).66
However, while the new chapter on groups provides means for cooperation
and coordination of group insolvencies, it does not sufficiently endorse the
practice of centralization.
Indeed, the design of provisions for groups presented challenges, and
the drafting of the chapter on groups involved several iterations and
negotiations between the Parliament and the Commission. The European
Commission’s original proposal (from 2012) of a group chapter only
contained provisions on cooperation between multiple group proceedings.67
The idea was that liquidators appointed in proceedings concerning entities
of the same group would cooperate if such cooperation would facilitate the
effective administration of the proceedings, including sharing information,
exploring the possibilities of group restructuring, and coordinating the
supervision of the group affairs. The courts too would similarly cooperate.
The liquidators would have the right to be heard and participate in other
group entities’ proceedings, to request a stay of such proceedings, and to
propose a rescue plan.68
The Commission’s initial approach resembles the manner in which the
relationship between main and secondary proceedings is addressed in the
current text of the revised Regulation. In that context too, liquidators and
courts are duty-bound to cooperate. However, regarding secondary
proceedings, it may now be possible to limit the opening of such
proceedings to circumstances where it is necessary to protect the interests of
local creditors.69 In contrast, no limitations were suggested regarding the
opening of parallel proceedings against related companies. Various other
new provisions will ensure that the leading role of the liquidator in the main
proceeding is retained vis-à-vis the secondary proceedings. In contrast, the
Commission did not include similar limitations regarding the opening or the
Pragmatism Revisited, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 250 (2014) (discussing the use of the
“head office functions” test to determine COMI).
65. SeeMevorach, Jurisdiction in Insolvency, supra note 24.
66. See Proposal for Amending the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 57, ch.IV a;
Compromise Text, supra note 57, ch. IVa. The negotiations on the revised Regulation were still
ongoing at the time this Article went to print.
67. See Proposal for Amending the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 57, ch. IVa.
68. Id. art. 42a-d.
69. Id. art. 29a; see also Compromise Text, supra note 57, art. 29a.
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handling of parallel proceedings against related companies of a group
enterprise. All liquidators were to have the same status and all could have
asked to stay other proceedings and propose a rescue plan. It was not
required or suggested to file the proceedings in a single jurisdiction, or to
instigate main or supervisory proceedings at a group center.
The initial proposal of the European Parliament for a group chapter
(proposed in 2011) was a much more obtrusive yet adaptive approach and
more akin to the practice of centralization. It provided concrete solutions for
different types of groups and suggested the centralization of group
proceedings in a single forum as the primary approach.70 The Parliament
recommended that where the group structure allows it, proceedings should
be centralized in the jurisdiction of the group headquarters.71 That would
have led to the application of that forum’s laws, based on the EU
Insolvency Regulation scheme whereby the forum applies its laws subject
to exceptions. Any additional proceedings opened against entities of the
same group would be ancillary to the main group proceedings. Where the
group is decentralized, the Parliament recommended that coordination
mechanisms should be used.
Indeed, to some extent, the practice of centralization was acknowledged
in the 2012 Commission’s proposal as well, through the introduction of a
new recital that stated that the rules proposed for groups should not limit the
possibility of a court’s opening of insolvency proceedings for several
companies belonging to the same group in a single jurisdiction.72 Such joint
opening would be possible if the court finds that the COMI of these
companies is located in a single member state. In such situations, the court
should also be able to appoint, if appropriate, the same insolvency
representative in all proceedings concerned. Yet, the centralization concept
was mentioned only in a recital and had no resonance within the body of the
group chapter.73
The European Parliament subsequently introduced amendments to the
Commission’s text. The revised Parliament’s proposal (of December 2013)
could be seen as a compromise between its original approach that
distinguished between different group scenarios and focused on
centralization, and the Commission’s “one-size fits all” cooperation-based
proposal.74 The Parliament suggested that in addition to the provisions
regarding cooperation among parallel proceedings of group entities, it
70. European Parliament, Comm. of Legal Affairs, Rep. with Recommendations to the
Commission on Insolvency Proceedings in the Context of EU Company Law, Part 3:
Recommendations on the Insolvency of Groups of Companies, 2011/2006(INI) (Oct. 17, 2011).
71. Id.
72. Proposal for Amending the EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 58, recital 20b.
73. Id.
74. European Parliament, Comm. on Legal Affairs, Draft Report on the Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 0744 (Dec. 20, 2012).
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should be possible for a court to open what is called “coordinating
proceedings” at any jurisdiction where a proceeding against a group entity
is pending, provided that the entity serves “crucial functions” within the
group and has its COMI in the jurisdiction.75 Where there is an attempt to
open such proceedings in several forums, the group coordinating
proceedings should be opened at the COMI of the most crucial member of
the group.
A more recent Compromise Text adopted by the Council of Ministers
(in June 2014) provides that such group coordination proceedings may be
requested at any court having jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings
of a member of the group by a practitioner appointed in a proceeding
opened in relation to a member of the group. If there are several requests,
the court first seized has jurisdiction. Where at least two-thirds of all
insolvency practitioners appointed in insolvency proceedings of the
members of the group have agreed that a court of another Member State
having jurisdiction is the most appropriate for the opening of group
coordination proceedings, that court shall have exclusive jurisdiction.76
The coordinator officer will have responsibility for mediating between
office-holders appointed in the various proceedings, identifying and
outlining recommendations for the conduct of the insolvency proceedings,
and proposing a group-wide plan if suitable. Once coordinating proceedings
are opened other office-holders would no longer have the right to request a
stay of measures with regard to other group members’ proceedings.77 The
Compromise Text further emphasizes that participation in a coordinated
proceeding is voluntary.78
Thus, the current text of the new group chapter is premised on
cooperation and coordination of multiple proceedings.79 No doubt,
cooperation and coordination are important mechanisms in the toolkit of
measures for addressing group insolvencies. As suggested above,
cooperation and coordination between parallel proceedings may be
particularly suitable for cases of decentralized groups that may not require
tighter solutions and full centralization of the process post-insolvency.
Indeed, such enterprises or parts thereof may be significantly decentralized
and not require any coordination at all, and therefore, the possibility to
include only some of the entities in a coordinated insolvency process is
commendable. Regrettably, though, still no reference is made in the current
75. “Crucial functions” refers to the ability, prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings
with respect to any member of the group, to take and enforce decisions of strategic relevance for
the group or parts of it. Alternatively, it means the economic significance within the group,
presumed if the group member contributed at least ten per cent to the consolidated balance sheet
total and consolidated turnover. Id. art. 2 (ja).
76. See Compromise Text, supra note 57, arts. 42d1-42d17.
77. Id.
78. Id. arts. 42d4-42d5.
79. Compromise Text, supra note 56, Ch. IVa.
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text of the group chapter, or elsewhere in the body of the (revised)
Regulation, to the new recital that mentions the possibility of identifying a
single COMI for all group entities. The impression might be, therefore, that
the primary (perhaps, even the only) relevant cross-border insolvency
measure for groups going forward is the opening of multiple proceedings in
different jurisdictions, with the possibility of coordinating them through the
group coordination proceedings.
The concern is that there may be less room under the framework
proposed in the revised Regulation for initiating proceedings against several
group members in the same forum and allowing that forum to apply its
laws, subject to possible modifications and protection of local interests. The
result may be that cooperation and coordination in cases of group
insolvencies may be enhanced. Yet, the insolvency process might be more
complicated than it could have been if more emphasis was put on
centralized solutions. In addition, under the proposed revised Regulation,
certain group solutions may not be possible at all. Thus, for example, even
if the applicable law of what could be regarded as the main group
(coordinating) forum would allow, in accordance with international
standards,80 the substantive consolidation of the estates where assets and
debts were significantly intermingled, the multiplicity of the proceedings
may preclude such a solution. The new chapter on groups also specifically
prohibits any possibility of consolidating the proceedings or the estates by
the coordinating practitioner.81
B. UNCITRALMODEL LAW
The cross-border insolvency scheme under the UNCITRAL Model Law
is similarly based on the notion of identifying the COMI of the debtor,
although such a determination is required for recognizing foreign
proceedings rather than for the purpose of opening proceedings.82 The
Model Law does not unify choice of law rules, as it only provides rules on
access, recognition, assistance, and relief.83 Therefore, both the recognizing
court and the opening court may apply their own private international law
rules to determine which laws to apply regarding insolvency matters.
Nonetheless, it is possible under the Model Law that the opening court will
apply its domestic laws and then seek their recognition through the Model
Law’s relief provisions,84 achieving a de facto centralized applicable law
solution. Indeed, the Model Law envisions that the recognizing court may
80. See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVEGUIDE PART THREE, supra note 5.
81. See Compromise Text, supra note 56, art. 42d12(3).
82. MODEL LAW, supra note 1, art. 16.
83. See Jenny Clift, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency—A Legislative
Framework to Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 TUL. J.
INT’L&COMP. L. 307, 324 (2004).
84. MODEL LAW, supra note 1, art. 21.
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turn over assets to the foreign representative and entrust the foreign
representative with the administration or realization of assets as well as the
distribution of assets located in the recognizing state.85 The consequence of
such relief is that the assets will become part of a single insolvency estate
and will be distributed, unless other conditions apply, according to the laws
of the opening state.86
The concentrated lex fori concursus approach is further reinforced by
the recommendation in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law to afford the lex fori concursus a dominant role.87 Indeed, under the
Model Law framework, this solution would primarily apply to single
companies, as the Model Law does not provide rules for groups.
Nonetheless, it is possible that proceedings that were opened with regard to
two or more member entities of a group in the same forum will be
recognized under the Model Law. Similar to the position under the EU
Insolvency Regulation, such a conclusion could be based on the finding that
all entities had their COMI in the same forum, and would be facilitated by
focusing on the location of the entities’ central administration
(headquarters) and by considering the purpose of the proceedings. Courts in
the United States and Canada have been particularly inclined to apply the
Model Law in this way to facilitate group-wide solutions. Thus, they have
often recognized foreign proceedings opened against related companies,
including entities registered in the local (recognizing) forum, in the
jurisdiction of the group head office.88 Such solutions are likely to be
further promoted by the recent revision to the Guide to Enactment of the
Model Law that clarified the meaning of COMI, and now provides that
COMI primarily refer to the location of the company’s headquarters.89
Centralization of group proceedings (and the applicable laws) through the
recognition and relief provisions in the Model Law could be subject to
conditions, to reflect, for example, a scenario of decentralization and
85. Id.
86. Such relief is subject to the requirement that the court is satisfied that the interests of the
local creditors are adequately protected. MODEL LAW, supra note 1, arts. 21(2), 22. See also
Mevorach, On the Road to Universalism, supra note 24, at 543–50.
87. See UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVEGUIDE, supra note 16, rec. 31.
88. See, e.g., Petroflow Energy Ltd, 17 September 2010, No. 1001-13659 (Court of Queen’s
Bench, Alberta); TerreStar Network Inc., 19 October 2010, 21 October 2010, 9 November 2010,
19; November 2010, No. CV-10-8944-00CL (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); TLC Vision
Corporation, 21 December 2009; 23 December 2009 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); Pope &
Talbot, Inc., et al., No. 08-11933 (Bankr. D. Del., 2008); Shermag Inc., No. 08-12015 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C., 2008); Madill Equipment Canada, et al., No. 08-41426 (Bankr. W.D. Wa., 2008). See
alsoMevorach, On the Road to Universalism, supra note 24, at 537–43.
89. See U.N. Secretariat, Interpretation and Application of Selected Concepts of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency Relating to Centre of Main Interests (COMI),
¶¶ 123D-123I, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.112 (Feb. 11, 2013). The final text of the revised
Guide to Enactment should be available soon on the UNITRAL website (http://www.uncitral.org).
The author had the privilege of participating in the deliberations as adviser to the United Kingdom
delegation. All views expressed here, though, are solely those of the author.
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mismatch between the insolvency solutions and ex ante realities and
expectations. Thus, group optimal solutions could be, and have been,
achieved under the Model Law.
Indeed, the global cross-border insolvency framework too could be
developed further to provide greater clarity and guidance through the design
of explicit provisions concerning groups, as well as rules regarding the
applicable law. The need for such rules has been acknowledged by
UNCITRAL, which is now considering the development of its regime to
address international groups in insolvency.90 It has also indicated an
intention to develop choice of law rules in future projects. Such initiatives
are particularly important in view of sometimes inconsistent applications of
the Model Law, in particular the relief provisions, which are currently
loosely defined and leave considerable room for discretion and varied
interpretation.91
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this Article showed that, most often, the optimal choice
of law solution for group insolvency would be a universalist centralized
one, whereby all of the process will take place in one forum that would
apply its laws. Many groups (or parts thereof) that enter into insolvency as a
whole are integrated and therefore would benefit from a global group-wide
solution. A concentration of the process and laws can facilitate such an
approach. Creditors’ expectations are not defeated by such centralization if
the cross-border insolvency framework ensures that the forum that applies
its laws to the insolvency matters represents a real connection to each of the
entities. There is also no defeat of the corporate form since assets and debts
remain separate, except for specific justifications that would allow “lifting
the corporate veil” (that are beyond the private international law analysis).
In certain cases, the group, although integrated, has decentralized
management structure with subsidiaries having distinct centers, in addition
to being linked to the group center forum. In such cases, it was submitted,
the presumption in terms of choice of law and forum should be the handling
of multiple, coordinated, proceedings. However, even in cases of
decentralized enterprise structures, often the process will require
centralization, especially if the group or the business plans to go forward in
a more unified manner. A cross-border insolvency framework should be
equipped with nuanced measures, allowing the pursuit of centralized
solutions in these cases too, while ensuring that the group forum can give
effect to local creditor protections. In cases where no center of control or
90. Deliberations started in April 2014.
91. See Tacon v. Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010).
Cf. Jaffé v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (In re Qimonda), 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013). See also Janger,
supra note 45, at 184–85.
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coordination can be identified, the proceedings may be handled in parallel,
and group solutions may be achieved through cooperation.
Current frameworks for cross-border insolvency provide some answers
along the above lines, even if not explicitly, and the practice has evolved in
a pragmatic way that has reflected group economic realities. Further
developments of the frameworks present an opportunity to provide clearer
and more comprehensive solutions. Yet, such developments also entail the
risk that in attempting to provide specific rules for groups, a one size fits all
solution might emerge, or that the unjustified concern regarding “veil
lifting” would take the regime a step backwards by giving primacy to
solutions that are merely based on cooperation or on a minimal degree of
coordination, between multiple proceedings. It is hoped, though, that even
if the cross-border insolvency frameworks will end up appearing as
constraining group solutions by focusing merely on cooperation and
coordination, pragmatic optimal approaches will continue to prevail.
